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PREFACE 
This paper has been produced as part of IIASA's hazardous waste manage- 
ment work. which is the  main component of the Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies project. The overall aim of this work. reflected in this 
paper, is to systematize our understanding of interactions between institu- 
tional and technical factors in policy making and implementation. The 
influence of institutional processes upon technical knowledge built into policy 
has been increasingly recognized. However, it has yet to be adequately clarified 
in comparative research on different regulatory systems. Institutional struc- 
tures canot be easily transplanted from one culture to another. Nevertheless, 
through the normal flux of policy. institutional development slowly occurs any- 
way, in more or less ad hoc fashion. Comparative insight may help to  direct 
reflection and adaptation in more deliberate and constructive ways. 
This paper forms one draft chapter of an intended book on hazardous waste 
management. The reader will therefore notice references to other draft 
chapters in this study which are  also being circulated separately, and which are  
available from IIASA. A full list is given overleaf. At this stage the papers are  
drafts, and are not intended for publication in present form. They are being 
circulated for review and revision. 
1 would like to  thank those policy makers and others who have exchanged 
papers and information with us, and those who generously gave of their time 
and experience in the many interviews which form a substantial input to  this 
work A full list of acknowledgements will eventually be published. 
Brian Wynne 
Research Leader 
Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies 
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CHAPTER m: 
Government Responsibility for Risk 
The Bavarian and Hessian Hazardous 
Waste Disposal Systems* 
Joanne Iinnerooth and Gary Davis 
Most western, industrialized nations have passed legislation for identifying 
hazardous waste streams, tracking their transport, and controlling and moni- 
toring their disposal. With few exceptions, legislators have recognized that  the 
best disposal is "no disposal", and have established the reduction and recycling 
of industrial wastes as  a Arst priority. For the wastes that  inevitably remain, 
high temperature incineration and physical or chemical treatment are  gen- 
erally considered preferable to  the direct land disposal of these wastes. With 
the exception of the United KingdomL* most national authorities call for the 
minimization of land disposal. 
.This paper is based upon extensive interpiem in the F.R.G. conducted by Jobst Conrad, 
Gary Davis, and Brian Wynne. We are indebted to  Jobst for providing extensive material and 
insights into the F.R.G. system. 
** The U.K. claims to have a geological structure especially well suited for landillling of 
chemical wastes. 
Despite ambitious legislation, there is concern on the part of regulators 
and the public about the effective implementation of hazardous waste manage- 
ment. Administrators are therefore looking to other countries for workable 
examples. Two states in the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), Hesse and 
Bavaria, along with the Scandinavian countries, stand out as having systems 
that  generally promote the commonly recognized objectives for the manage- 
ment of hazardous wastes. Hesse and Bavaria reportedly place relatively little 
(around 40%) of their hazardous wastes in landfills and have taken steps to 
encourage industry to reduce and recycle its wastes. The remainder of the 
hazardous wastes in these two states is either pretreated before being deposited 
(around 20%) or, what is generally considered the superior method. incinerated 
a t  'high temperatures (around 40%). These figures. although they are not 
readily comparable because of the significant national differences in defining 
and reporting hazardous waste, indicate that  considerably less wastes are 
directlg disposed of on land in Hesse and Bavaria than in many other European 
and Narth American countries.+ 
The apparent success of these two states in handling their hazardous 
wastes. relative to other countries, is usually attributed to their institutional 
systerrra. They have large, integrated public facilities for storage. treatment and 
incineration of wastes, which are. for the  most part, equipped with up-to-date 
environmental technology. The state and local governments have taken the  
major role in hanc ing ,  operation. and regulations promoting and sustaining 
these facilities, and have assumed central responsibility for the management of 
As cases in point, the Netherlands reportedly deposit 88% of their hazardous wastes in 
landfills [I], the U.K 75% [2], and around BOX of U.S. wastes are disposed of on land [3]. Also, 
in the whole of the F.R.G., it is estimated that 80% of its hazardous wastes (including treat- 
ment residues) are disposed of on land [4]. 
hazardous wastes. 
For other countries or regions, the merits of public financing or ownership 
of hazardous waste facilities. and related issues of comprehensive facilities and 
pricing schemes, should be viewed within the general political, institutional, 
and economic context in which these systems have evolved and are expected to 
work In this paper, we describe the Hessian and Bavarian experiences with this 
more general perspective in mind. Following a brief discussion in the next sec- 
tion of the  technical'management options for dealing with hazardous wastes, 
the F.RG. hazardous waste legislation and its implementation, will be 
described in Section 111. We turn  then to looking closely a t  practices in Hesse 
and Bavaria. In Section VI, we discuss some of the advantages of and the prob- 
lems inherent to the Hessian and Bavarian hazardous waste management stra- 
tegies. libally, we offer some perspectives for other regions and countries, 
where the  state of North Rhine-Westfalia in the F.R.G., with its combined 
private/public system, and the United States, with its similar federal and state 
political system and capitalist industrial traditions, serve as comparative exam- 
ples. We limit our discussion to  current hazardous waste practices, excluding 
both the problems of nuclear waste disposal and the clean-up of past dumping 
sites. 
11. OPTIONS FOR HANDLING HAZARDOUS W A S l X S  
The predominant method for dealing with hazardous wastes in most indus- 
trialized countries remains, land disposal. This includes surface impoundment 
or ponding, where liquid wastes are  contained in natural or man-made depres- 
sions with special clay or synthetic liners, land spreading or farming, where 
wastes are tilled into the  topsoil; deep well injection, where wastes are  placed 
below groundwater in formations sealed off from above. and landfill, where 
hazardous wastes are  placed directly in or on the ground. In the U.S., for exam- 
ple, surface impoundments and landfills account for an estimated eighty per- 
cent of the disposal of industrial hazardous wastes [5], and many other indus- 
trial countries report similar figures. General purpose landfills, which receive 
most of the landfilled industrial wastes, are those facilities with no contain- 
ment, monitoring or leachate collection systems, but in contrast to  open 
dumps, these facilities do periodically cover the wastes. In sanitary landfills 
the wastes are spread in layers and covered after each operating day. Secure 
landfills, segregate wastes into separate cells, take measures to prevent con- 
tamination ef natural water, and are continuously monitored. 
Landfills can present two main types of environmental problems: flres, 
explosions and pollution of air, and contamination of surface and groundwaters. 
There is a growing, although not complete consensus, that  state-of-the-art 
landfills are not appropriate for certain wastes, e.g. organic solvents and inor- 
ganic acids and that  generally not enough is understood about the synergistic 
effect of chemical mixing or the reliability of natural or  synthetic liners to 
guarantee proper long-term containment [B]. 
Increased documentation of the risks from surface impoundments and 
landfilling has led to  growing interest in the development and promotion of 
alternative technologies, where the following hierarchy has been proposed as 
an optimal management strategy [7]: 
Waste Reduction or Recycling. 
Physical, Chemical. and Biological Treatment: These include physical 
processes. such as mechanical Altering, chemical processes by which 
the molecular structure of the waste is changed, and biological 
processes that  rely on microorganisms to treat  organic materials. 
These treatment techniques can render wastes innocuous or reduce 
their toxicity. 
Incineration: Controlled thermal treatment destroys or renders 
wastes less hazardous and can be used to recover energy. High tem- 
perature incineration is generally considered one of the safest 
methods for treating organic wastes. 
SolidiAcation/Stabilization of Residuals before Landfill: This method 
consists of various encapsulation techniques to "solidify" wastes and 
make them less permeable. 
Although i t  is not  the  intent of this. paper to discuss the scientific merits 
and uncertainties of hazardous waste management options (for a full elabora- 
tion, see Wynne, Chapter 3). i t  should be noted that any management hierarchy 
for hazardous chemical wastes- is necessarily based on inadequate and uncer- 
tain scientific knowledge. For instance, high temperature incineration is 
widely considered a relatively safe method of treatment for organics. Yet little 
is known about the chemistry of incineration, especially how the technique 
deals with particular mixtures of hazardous wastes even in those cases where 
the breakdown characteristics of individual compounds are understood. Furth- 
ermore, management hierarchies, such as the one listed above, follow pri- 
marily from an engineering knowledge of the environmental risks and are based 
to a f a r  less extent on institutional considerations involved in implementation. 
Where wastes are managed behind the factory gates and where the human fac- 
tor plays a significant role, the  possibility of mismanagement is not negligible. 
This is true for landfill, which relies on the operator's knowledge of mixing 
wastes, etc.. as well as high temperature incineration which relies on fairly nar- 
row optimal conditions, for example, to ensure complete combustion of the 
wastes and production of toxic emissions. These factors are all the more 
signiflcant when the underlying technical uncertainties are significant. 
The point here is not to question this generally accepted management 
hierarchy, but to recognize the inherent uncertainties and the inevitably 
dynamic nature of any current regulatory goals.* Because of the manifold 
uncertainties it  is important to develop an institutional base for implementing 
regulations that  is resilient to changes in scientific knowledge. With this in 
mind, we turn to experience in Hesse and Bavaria, where the state governments 
have assumed responsibility for the risks presented by the management of 
hazardous wastes. 
Background 
The constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949 established the F.R.G. as a federa- 
tion of what are currently eleven autonomous states, called Liinder (see Figure 
1). Most regulatory power is distributed between the federal government and 
the states; however, in contrast to the U.S.. the F.RG. constitution vests in the 
states the responsibility for implementing and enforcing laws enacted by the  
federal parliament. The German states therefore, enjoy a more powerful posi- 
tion in relation to the federal government than their American counterparts. 
Political decision making in the F.R.G. cannot be understood adequately 
unless one takes into account the specific separation of powers between the leg- 
islature and the executive as laid down in the constitution. In contrast to the  
In Denmark, for example, the incineration of domestic wastes was considered the optimal 
disposal method and dominated all other technologies in the 1870's, but today it is no longer 
unquestionably the best method [8]. 
moa~ I .  Location o f  Hazardous ths te  Treatment and Disposal F a c i l  i i t e s  i n  
the Federal Republic o f  Germany (1  1 ) .  
U.S. system, which fosters a unique competition between the executive and leg- 
islative branches, in most European countries the powerful ties of party 
membership greatly reduce the likelihood of discord between the executive and 
the majority in parliament. The history of recent chemical control legislation 
indicates that many of the systematic divergences between U.S. and European 
environmental law can be attributed to this difference in executive-legislative 
relations and underlying political culture [lo]. By channeling draft legislation 
through a tight interministerial structure, most European governments, 
including the F.R.G., develop bills that  most closely resemble their actual 
intended agenda for implementation.. In contrast, the American Congress for- 
mulates legislation with less emphasis implementation, leaving this task to  the  
agencies responsible for formulating regulations. 
This institutionalized cooperation between the federal ministries in work- 
ing out legislative details before formal consideration of a bill in parliament 
mirrors a more general cooperative ideology both between the federal govern- 
ment and state governments and between government and industry. At  the 
state level, where implementation strategies a re  formulated and carried out, it 
is normal for government authorities to work closely with industry, and possi- 
bly other interested or influential parties. in formulating policy. At this level, 
s tate and local ofllcials generally have discretion to develop "workable" regula- 
tions and standards with industry. This historical partnership between govern- 
ment and industry, in addition to the power which the states enjoy in imple- 
This tendency towards political compromise in the F.R.G. is, in some cases, changing by 
the recent formation of citized action groups of all kinds. With regard to environmental is 
rmea, for example, nuclear power, a growing number of these groups has entered into the 
political arena. There are also significant differences bohvsen European countries which 
have yet to be fully analysed, especially where coalition government is normal, e.g., the 
Netherlands and Denmark, (see Wynne, Chapter 7). 
menting federal legislation, formed the basis for the close government and 
industry cooperation in the  management of hazardous wastes in Hesse and 
Bavaria. 
The Federal W a s t e  Disposal Act 
Hazardous waste in the F.R.G. is regulated under the Federal Waste Disposal 
Act (Abfallbeseitigungsgesetz, AbfG) of 1972, as amended in 1976, 1980, and 
1982, which went into effect on 1st January, 1977. As in other countries, the  
legislation was designed to cope with waste in general, and not only hazardous 
waste. Certain types of hazardous waste are regulated separately and excluded 
from the Waste Disposal Act, such as  waste oil. nuclear waste. waste water, mili- 
tary wastes, and wastes from mining. Dumping a t  sea is regulated by the Dump- 
ing a t  Sea Act of 1977. 
The Waste Disposal Act, and its accompanying Administrative Orders, are 
formulated a t  the federal level and implemented by the states (LZnder) in 
cooperation with counties (Kreise) and municipalities (Gemeinde). Consistent 
with F.RG. regulatory tradition, this legislation lays out a framework which the  
h d e r  are obliged to  follow, but which is general enough to allow them a great 
deal of discretion in choosing how the  statutory goals will be met. 
In relation even to the U.S. hazardous waste legislation (Resource Conser- 
vation and Recovery Act) of 1976, the  general objectives of the Waste Disposal 
Act appear rather ambitious. Wastes must be disposed of such that  the well- 
being of the general public is not afiected, in particular to prevent dangers to 
the environment and public health. The Act makes no attempt to define further 
I 
what is meant by "prevention of danger" by laying out specific safety or risk cri- 
teria. I t  does state that a first priority with respect to hazardous wastes is to 
prevent or reduce their generation. 
Dealing generally with wastes, household garbage as well as industrial 
waste, the federal legislation requires each generator to cede his wastes to the 
competent county (Kreise or Kreisfreie Stadte) authorities for treatment or 
disposal. A t  the same time, i t  assigns responsibility to the local authorities by 
obliging them to handle the wastes generated in their region by providing ade- 
quate facilities. Exceptionally, with the consent of the respective Land author- 
ties, these local bodies can be relieved of their obligation to handle certain 
wastes if, because of their nature (e.g., toxicity) or quantity (e.g., ice and snow), 
such wastes cannot be diposed of in local facilities (AbfG, Section 3.3). These 
wastes, which must be decided on a case by case basis, have become known as 
"special wastes", although the term cannot actually be found in the 1972 legis- 
lation. The purpose of this exception is to transfer responsibility for handling 
certain wastes from the local authorities to the generator of the wastes; the 
term "special waste" should thus be understood as an administrative definition. 
Alternatively, the term "special waste" requires a more scientific 
deflnition. The 1972 legislation referred to certain wastes from commercial or 
other economic undertakings which, by their type, characteristics or quantity, 
may endanger health, air or  water, be explosive or inflammable, or contain or 
cause infectious or contagious diseases (AbfG, Section 2). This concept was 
defined more precisely in an Administrative Order of 1977, which does not con- 
tain a list of chemicals, but rather a list of 86 specific wastes. (see Dowling and 
Linnerooth, Chapter 4). There is no procedure given for adding to or subtract- 
ing from this list; however, states have the right to supplement it  in their own 
waste plans. 
The Waste Disposal Act and its accompanying Administrative Orders set up 
a formally complete system of control, the "cradle to grave" system. which. in 
principle. allows for the comprehensive public control of hazardous wastes by 
tracing the path of each waste from its generation to its place of disposal. 
According to the Administrative Order on the  Notification of Waste of 1974, as 
amended in 1978, a trip-ticket procedure and record keeping can be imposed on 
the owner of special wastes. and are mandatory for generators of hazardous 
waste. In addition, operators of certain facilities handling special wastes are 
required to appoint a waste disposal agent, protected from dismissal by law, who 
monitors the production, transport, and ultimate disposal of wastes. 
Which waste diposal facilities are used is established in the waste disposal 
plans, which must be drawn up by the Lander, and are binding for local and dis- 
trict authorities. In principle, wastes ,may only be treated, stored or deposited 
in approved installations, and transported by certified operators. The licensing 
of waste disposal plants is generally done in planning permission proceedings, 
where all public and private interests that  could be affected by the scheme 
should be considered. 
From this brief description of the Waste Disposal Act, and its Administrative 
Orders, the  F.R.G. appears to have a relatively comprehensive legislative sys- 
tem, a t  least formally, for regulating hazardous wastes. Commentators and 
regulators, however, point to a number of weak points in the system. To begin, 
the effectiveness of the regulatory framework to "protect the well-being of the 
general public" will depend crucially on whether all wastes that are in fact 
hazardous are included in the universe of regulated wastes or the 86 wastes 
defined as potentially dangerous. Some states, most notably Hesse, have 
greatly expanded this list. Ways of legally evading the system also exist. A 
serious loophole appears to be the  used oil exclusion. since used oil can legally 
contain a certain amount of hazardous substances. and is often sold as heating 
oil for apartment buildings and houses. A second, equally important, loophole 
concerns the recycling of waste; generators may declare their waste as an 
economic good if they have a willing buyer. and in so doing are  not required to 
enter it in the notification system. A general clause allows the Minister of 
Defense to make exceptions from the Waste Disposal Act and the corresponding 
administrative orders for military wastes. In addition, the legal possibility 
exists in the Federal framework for generators to  export their wastes to  other 
states or countries with less stringent requirements. Bavaria and Hesse alone 
have imposed their own State level export restrictions, so as  to protect the 
market of waste arisings for their own public facilities. These loopholes are 
considered to  be serious, and attempts to close them by amending the Federal 
Waste Dispoal Act are currently underway. 
Implementation 
Other than the general framework laid out in the Waste Disposal Act, and 
Administrative Orders, the  federal government has little to  do with the actual 
practices of waste management.' The German states assisted by the county and 
municipal authorities, have full responsibility for implementing the legislation. 
The practices of the states in this respect vary considerably. Lists of 
hazardous wastes range from the 86 mandatory wastes in the federal regulatons 
to 299 in Eesse; only a few states, notably Hesse, Bavaria, Hamburg, and Baden- 
The Federal Environment Ministry (UBA) carries out research, disseminates information, 
and provides technical assistance to the Under, especially in the area of recycling and 
waste reduction. 
Wiirtemberg, are attempting to computerize the trip-ticket system and, in 
effect, make i t  operational;** the number of personnel, including inspectors, 
employed to implement the legislation also differs considerably among the 
states. The discretion which the state enjoys in implementing the Waste Dispo- 
sal Act is reflected most strongly by the Waste Disposal Plans, which show 
signiflcant inter-state variations regarding the type of disposal or  treatment 
prescribed for different waste streams. 
A main concern in this paper, is the strategic and organizational difference 
between those states which have publicly-owned or publicly-supported 
integrated facilities and those which rely on a larger number of privately-owned 
and decentralized facilities. Figure 1 shows how Hesse and Bavaria have organ- 
ized waste disposal around a few comprehensive facilities, which are partially or 
fully owned by the local or state authorities, compared. for example, with North 
Rhine-Westfalia, which operates with numerous private waste enterprises (and a 
recently built regional facility). These differences go beyond that of organiza- 
tion, since the outcomes OF the systems themselves are  very different. Most 
notably, Hesse and Bavaria place a relatively small proportion of their wastes 
directly in landfills, compared to other states. In the next two sections, we will 
describe in some detail the  Hessian and Bavarian waste management systems, 
including the way in which these states have defined hazardous wastes. the 
technologies employed, and their economic, legal and institutional context. 
** This system puts a large burden on the regional authorities, who are responsible, in con- 
trast to  many states in the US, for checking that each shipment of hazardous waste reaches 
i ts  intended destination, but, in ~rac t i c e ,  the paperwork is too excessive for effective con- 
trol. For example, the municipality of Kassel in Hesae is relatively lightly industrialized 
with around 200 ATms generating hazardous waste, 50 to 70 hospitals, and numerous gas sta- 
tioris. According to  an official in the Kassel Regie~sbezirksprasidium. there are over 
12,000 triptickets per year, which is more than enough for three full-time employees to 
control effectively [ll]. 
IY. HAZARDOUS WASl'E DISPOSAL IN HESSE 
Hesse is considered by many waste authorities of industrial countries to 
have one of the more progressive and successful systems for managing hazar- 
dous wastes. This is due principally to its modern, centralized facilities. espe- 
cially the incineration plant a t  Biebesheim, and to its general performance 
record with respect to the way in which wastes are managed. According to the 
Hessian Ministry for Development. Environment, Agriculture and Forestry, the 
primary goal of a waste management system is to improve the environment to 
the greatest possible extent. This means that the highest priority must be put 
on reduc ing  and avoiding the production of wastes, followed by recycling, and 
finally the safe disposal of the remaining wastes. As the following breakdown for 
the 300,000'tons of hazardous wastes generated in 1981 shows. only 40% of these 
wastes were deposited in landfills [12]. 
Landfill 120.000 metric tons (40%) 
Underground deposit 20.000 (6.7%) 
Chemical-physical treatment 90,000 (30%) 
Incineration on land 50.000 (16.6%) 
Incineration a t  sea 20.000 (6.7%) 
What is Hazardous in Hesse? 
Hesse has greatly increased the number of wastes requiring special treat- 
ment; the authorities have listed 299 hazardous waste types compared with 86 
on the federal list. According to the Hessian regulations, industrial wastes can 
be divided into the following three classifications. each with a recommended 
disposal method (which is decided more specifically by the government in the 
case of each waste): 
I. Industrial wastes that  are similar to municipal garbage and can gen- 
erally be treated as such. 
11. Industrial wastes that  are hazardous and cannot be treated with 
household waste, thereby requiring special treatment, such as treat- 
ment, incineration, deposition in secured landfills. 
111. Industrial wastes that  are especially hazardous and require treatment 
under "special technical conditions", i.e. salt mine deposition or high 
temperature incineration. 
Categories I1 and I11 can be regarded as hazardous wastes, where category 
111 wastes are special priority or especially hazardous.' From the 563 waste 
types listed in the LAGA catalog (see Dowling/Linnerooth, Chapter 4), 282 are 
identified as Category 11, and 37 as Category 111. 
"Special waste" is, in Hesse. like in the federal legislation, a general' adrnin- 
istrative concept. I t  includes those wastes in any of the three categories, 
which. because of their type, quantity, or characteristics, cannot be deposited 
together with household wastes. Of the 2.1 million tons of industrial wastes pro- 
duced in Hesse in 1982, 1.4 million tons were deposited with household wastes 
and 0.7 tons were considered special. The special wastes, in turn. consisted of 
only about half, or 0.3 million tons belonging to Categories I1 and III [13].# 
The kgal and Institutional lhminork 
The organization of hazardous waste management in Hesse is legally based 
on the Federal Waste Disposal Act and Special Waste Order, .the Hessian Waste 
Law, promulgated in 1978, and the Hessian Waste Management Plan, particu- 
larly the partial plan "Special Wastes from Industry and Firms" (1976). This 
plan assigns full responsibility for special wastes to the  Hessian lndustriemiill 
* An analogous example of a state that has classified some wastes aa "priority" is California. 
With some exeptions, the Hessian priority list (Category UI) and the California priority list 
are surprisingly similar. 
f An example of a category 1 (non-hazardous) "special" waste would be large volumes of 
snow from road-clearance, earth ballast, etc. 
GmbH (HIM), which was established in 1974. The HIM is currently jointly owned 
by the Hessian government (26%) and a consortium of 25 Hessian waste- 
producing industries (74%), both with equal voting representation. This 
arrangement evolved from a private waste management company fhanced by 
hazardous waste generators which encountered financial dimculties. The Hes- 
sian government rescued and part assumed joint responsibility for the facili- 
ties. With this public responsibility was also established the  central control of 
wastes to restrict export and competition. and protect the economic viability of 
the infrastructure. 
Government authorities in Hesse thus exert a direct control over hazar- 
dous waste management through the state's part ownership of HIM. The respon- 
sible agency is the Hessian Ministry for Development, Environment, Agricul- 
ture, and Forestry, which categorizes wastes, specifies how they will be 
managed, and promulgates standards for emissions from industrial facilities. 
The Hessian authorities require that all industries deliver their special wastes 
to the HIM, the  so-called "Benutzungszwang" or "compulsory use". The regional 
authorities are primarily responsible for monitoring and regulating the tran- 
sportation of wastes, and the actual operation of waste facilities. 
The Facilities 
The HIM operates four hazardous waste facilities in Hesse. The most recent 
is the Biebesheim incineration facility, which was completed in 1981, and which 
is considered by authorities to be the state-of-the-art in hazardous waste 
incineration. Two chemical-physical treatment facilities are in operation in 
Frankfurt and Kassel, and a small landfill is in operation for the district of Mar- 
burg. A large landfill, which has encountered extensive public opposition, is 
now being planned for Mainflingen. In addition to these HIM facilities, Kali and 
Salz AG. operates an underground salt mine deposit near Herfa-Neurode. 
Although there are now no transfer stations for special wastes in Hesse, 
several are planned, and the HIM is testing a waste pick-up service for small 
generators. The HIM in the Marburg district has set up a new service to 
encourage the safe disposal of small quantities of special wastes. Industrial cus- 
tomers that generate less than 500 kg/year can deliver wastes to a special 
truck and pay only 1 DM per kg. Citizens bringing household toxic wastes may 
do so free. The system is financed by a tax on waste production levied by the  
cities and counties, its level depending on the quantity and type of waste pro- 
duced. 
The Biebesheim incineration facility consists of two rotary kilns, after 
burners, heat recovery and a novel scrubbing system for the  exhaust gases.. 
The chemical-physical treatment plant a t  Frankfurt and Kassel use standard 
technologies for cyanide destruction, neutralization, and precipitation. Only 
solids or dewatered sludges, usually treatment residues, are  permitted to  be 
landfllled in Hesse. Lacking landml capacity, HIM exports most of the  treat- 
ment residues and other wastes for landfill to neighboring states (Baden- 
Wiirtemberg, Bavaria. Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westfalia). Only t h e  most 
toxic and persistent wastes that  cannot be easily treated are  sent  to the salt 
mines a t  Herfa-Neuroda. Wastes are  imported to the salt mines from all states 
in the F.R.G. without restriction, but wastes may come from other countries 
* This system scrubs wet but then dries the liquid to a powder. Halogenated organics are in- 
cinerated up to a chlorine content of 30X; above this level, the waste is sent to  the salt 
mines a t  Herfa-Neuroda (but only in solid form). Though the faczty employs good environ- 
mental control equipment, i t  would not meet all of California's air quality requirements 
[141. 
only if the foreign authorities agree to cooperate with the F.R.G. in other types 
of waste management, such as nuclear waste disposal. 
Hazardous wastes may be treated. incinerated. or disposed of on-site by the 
generator only with special permission from HIM; statistics on the amounts 
handled on-site are not available. Exisiting disposal facilities may continue to 
operate, but no new facilities, with the exception of water treatment, will be 
permitted. Firms handling their own wastes are not permitted to accept wastes 
from other generators. 
Hesse is requiring documentation of waste reduction and recycling meas- 
ures by those seeking permission from the planning authorities to construct 
new industrial facilities and to  expand existing ones. The state will deny this 
permission unless the facility owner includes up-to-date measures for pollution 
reduction and recycling processes. This program which is not directly provided 
for by law, is very controversial and has been challenged by industry in court 
[ 151. 
The Financial Arrangenrenta 
The original industry owners of HIM financed the first facilities, but cost 
difEculties forced the state government to  become increasingly involved, Arst 
by supplying low-interest loans, and later by directly subsidizing investment 
expenditures. The Hessian government paid most of the capital costs for the 
Biebesheim facility (DM 100 million) and recently, contributed an additional 
subsidy of 9 million DM. The prices per ton for disposing of hazardous wastes by 
the HIM in 1981 were as follows [16]: 
Landflll 60-300 DM ($25-130) 
Chemical-physical treatment 20-530 DM ($9-230) 
Incineration on land 340-950 DM ($150-420) 
Disposal in salt mines 100 DM ($80) 
These prices do not reflect the full costs of disposal. but are increasingly subsi- 
dized by the Hessian government. The subsidies are not passed on in full to the 
facility users in price increases. One reason for this is that  the Hessian author- 
ities are becoming concerned about over capacity, especially a t  the  Biebesheim 
facility. The amount of Hessian wastes incinerated at  Biebesneim has recently 
dropped from 50,000 tons per year to 36,000 tons and the  facility is now import- 
ing a total of 27.000 tons of waste per year. (10.000 tons from Baden- 
Wiirtemberg, 10,000 tons from the Netherlands, 5,000 tons from Switzerland, 
e 
and 2,000 tons from Belgium and Luxemburg. In addition, 20,000 tons per year 
are imported to the Herfa-Neuroda salt mines.) [I?] 
Because disposal prices in Hesse are higher than in neighboring states with 
less stringent regulations, or countries. e.g. the GDR, there is a strong 
economic motivation for producers to export their wastes. For this reason, 
except with special permission. the  export of hazardous wastes is forbidden. 
The importance of this compulsory use of the facilities, effectively creating a 
state-industry monopoly, for the economic viability of the facilities cannot be 
over emphasized. This will be discussed in more detail in Section VI. 
V. -US WASI'E PRACI'ICES IN BAVARIA 
Bavaria is the largest of the F.R.G. states with an area of 70,500 sq. h. 
and nearly 11 million inhabitants. Yet, it is not highly industrialized. producing 
less industrial waste (around 350,000 tons in 1983) than states such as Hesse or 
North Rhine-Westfalia. I t  is therefore a relatively dispersed system of waste pro- 
duction. Estimates show that  there are approximately 6,000 hazardous waste 
generators in Bavaria and around 120,000 shipments of hazardous waste per 
year [la]. 
Bavaria is of special interest because it recognized the hazardous waste 
problem very early on and became a forerunner for hazardous waste practices 
even shaping to a large extent the federal legislation. As early as 1966, the dis- 
trict of Mittelfranken founded a municipal cooperative [Mittelfranken Coopera- 
tive for Special Wastes (ZVSMM)] responsible for disposing of special wastes, and 
in 1970 a semi-public organization [the Association for Handling Special Wastes 
(GSB)] was created to handle special wastes for the res t  of Bavaria. In both 
instances, central facilities were built for treating, depositing, and incinerating 
hazardous wastes. 
With their impressive management record, the  organization of these two 
operations has served as a model for waste management in the  F.R.G. and other 
European countries. In 1981, 215,000 metric tons and 148,000 metric tons of 
hazardous wastes were disposed of by the GSB and the ZVSMM respectively. The 
proportion of these wastes that  were incinerated, treated by chemical or physi- 
cal methods, and deposited in secure landfills (mostly treatment residues) is 
shown below [19]: 
GSB ZVSMM* 
Incineration 53,000 t 29% 14,000 t 10% 
Chemical/Physical Treatment 97,000 t 45% 46,000 t 31% 
Landflll 55,000 t 26% 88,000 t 59% 
- 
* The relatively large amount of landfilling by the ZVSMM is principally due to one generator 
who disposes of large quantities of wastes containing vandium and chronium that cannot be 
In contrast to Hessian state documents (though not so much informal 
usage), the Bavarian authorities do not distinguish consistently between the 
terms "special waste" and "hazardous waste". "Special waste" is generally 
taken to mean it is hazardous, although some official recognition is given to the 
more administrative concept of special wastes as those excluded from the 
responsibility of local authorities. The original Bavarian list of hazardous 
wastes which included even a rough classification by degree of hazard. was later 
changed to accomodate the federal listing system. Currently, a total of 239 
wastes requiring regulation are included on the Bavarian list (for more detail. 
see Dowling and Linnerooth, Chapter 4). 
The Bavarian Law again echoes the framework legislation of the Federal 
Waste Disposal Act of 1972. More detailed provisions governing special waste 
management are contained in the Bavarian Waste Plan required by the federal 
law. Waste generators must notify the Bureau of Environmental Protection 
(Landesamt fiir Umweltschutz) of the Bavarian Ministry for Land Development 
and Environment of the types and quantities of wastes they produce. The 
Bureau then decides whether these wastes should be managed as hazardous 
wastes and in which category they belong. 
As in Hesse, (and for the same reasons) the export of hazardous wastes 
from Bavaria is prohibited without permission from the Bureau,* and genera- 
tors of hazardous wastes must obtain permission from the Bureau to dispose of 
their wastes on-site. Very large chemical companies such as Hoechst, for 
example. burn their own wastes. This practice. however, is generally 
treated profitably. 
* Exemptions from this prohibition can be secured for those wastes that cannot be burned, 
treated, or deposited safely in Bavaria; or, permission to  export may be justifled by the abili- 
ty of a large company to treat wastes a t  i ts  own facility in another state. 
discouraged and approval would likely include strict conditions on how the 
wastes must be managed. 
ZVSMM 
Environmental concerns arising towards the end of the 1960s from 
indiscriminate dumping practices inspired the towns and districs within the 
region of Mittelfranken to form the ZVSMM, at which time there was no effective 
legislation in the F.R.G. for dealing with the disposal of hazardous wastes. This 
facility serves, in addition to Mittelfranken, other parts of Bavaria and Baden 
Wiirtemberg. This region has a total area of 21,000 sq. km. (about 10% of the 
area of the F.R.G.), 3.7 million inhabitants. and approximately 4,000 industrial 
companies. 
The ZVSMM is of special interest in that it  is a fully public enterprise, in 
contrast to the joint government/industry owned facilities in Hesse and the 
rest of Bavaria The operation of the ZVSMM is the responsibility of six different 
state, county and municipal authorities [20]: 
The ZVSMM owns and operates the Schwabach disposal facility which con- 
sists of a rotary kiln incinerator, for organic wastes, a physical-chemical treat- 
ment plant, a waste water purification plant, and a clay-lined hazardous waste 
landfill. Control wells located around the landffll monitor the sealing capacity of 
the pit bottom and the integrity of the ground water. The ZVSMM does not 
operate collection vehicles, but relies on private transportation companies. 
The hazardous wastes delivered to the disposal facilities a t  Schwabach are 
weighed upon delivery and tested in the laboratory to check whether they 
match the description contained in the accompanying documents. This is a 
commercial as well as a risk management need. 
The Schwabach facilities are fully financed by the ZVSMM and the Bavarian 
state government, without any additional contribution from industry. As of 
1983, a total of 32 million DM had been invested in the facilities. The members 
of ZVSMM--5 large towns, 7 county districts, and 7 small towns-raised 5 million 
DM for the original capital investment, and the Bavarian government, approxi- 
mately 5.6 million DM. The remaining funds came from low-interest government 
loans (approximately 5 million DM) and user fees. These figures reflect the 
much lower capital costs in the 1960s, when Schwabach was built. New con- 
struction now deemed necessary will receive a 40-60% subsidy from the 
Bavarian government which will not have to be repayed. 
The state government, therefore, subsidizes the ZVSMM facilites directly by 
contributing to the capital investment and indirectly by offering low-interest 
loans. The prices charged at Schwabach or waste handling cover the remaining 
costs, including the non-subsidized capital costs, operating expenses, and 
interest payments. ZVSMM operates on a non-profit basis, and prices are set at 
the end of the year to reflect the anticipated costs for the next year. Prices for 
1982 ranged as follows [21]: 
LandfllL 50-100 DM per ton ($22- 44) 
Treatment 50- 70 DM per ton ($22- 31) 
Incineration 80-280 DM per ton ($35-123) 
'lhe GSB 
The GSB (the Gesellschaft zur Beseitigung von Sondermull) manages 
hazardous wastes in the .remainder of Bavaria. All special wastes outside of 
those handled by the ZVSMM must be delivered to the GSB unless permission is 
granted for on-site disposal or export. The GSB has four facilities, and seven 
transfer stations located around the state consolidate wastes for shipment to 
one of these facilities. These transfer stations also dewater sludges and oil- 
water emulsions and perform some acid-base neutralization to reduce volumes 
before shipment. 
The Ebenhausen plant, about 5 kilometers from Munich, includes two 
rotary kiln incinerators, a physical/chemical treatment plant, and a waste 
water treatment plant. The Schweinfurt disposal plant consists of an incinera- 
tor for industrial wastes, such as paper contaminated with oil, which can be 
incinerated with domestic refuse. GSB also operates a solvent recycling facility 
near Munich and a large landAll a t  Gallenbach. These facilities have been 
described in detail elsewhere [22]. For our purposes, it  is important to note 
only the most hazardous wastes containing organics are incinerated and the 
landfills do not accept liquid wastes, only dewatered sludges and nontoxic 
solids. 
The original capital investment for the GSB facilites of 1 million DM was 
raised by industry (30%), the  Bavarian government (40%), and member com- 
munities (30%). but subsequently the Bavarian government has underwritten 
all significant capital investment. As of 1980, the capital costs had totaled 
approximately 85 million DM. The original outlays on the part of the GSB 
members of 1 million DM had risen to a total of 21 million DM as of 1980. The 
remaining outlays have been financed by a combinaton of direct government 
subsidies, indirect subsidies of low-interest government loans, and user fees 
[231. 
Small quantities of untreated wastes can, however, be landtilled if the regulatory agency 
permits, a practice that resulted in an incident at the Wenbach landfill, where a reactive 
waste was landfilled causing a Are and a release of chlorine that injured a nearby resident. 
Again, the users do not pay the full costs of waste disposal. GSB charges 
disposal fees that cover operating costs (24 million DM in 1982), but not subsi- 
dies from the state government which average 60 - 80% of new capital costs. 
Prices in 1982 ranged as follows [24]: 
Landfill 64-195 DM per ton ($37-06 per ton) 
Treatment 70-285 DM per ton ($31-125 per ton) 
Incineration* 350-620 DM per ton ($154-273 per ton) 
I t  is striking that the prices charged by the ZVSMM are considerably lower 
that those charged by the GSB. The director of the ZVSMM attributes this 
difference to ZVSMM's lower operating costs [25]. Since the Schwabach facility 
has grown stage by stage. with capital expansions corresponding to increased 
demand, i t  supposedly does not have the Ebenhausen problem of over-capacity. 
The Schwabach plant, also according to its director, is more efficiently operated 
with less bureaucracy and without the expensive network of collection centers 
which were built by the GSB during a time of plentiful public funds. Finally, the  
Schwabach facility has a larger proportion of wastes being deposited, which 
decreases its relative costs. Other officials have suggested that  an additional 
reason for the ZVSMM cost advantage is that the facility, because i t  was built 
earlier, was not required to  install the costly environmental devices which were 
required for the Ebenhausen facility. 
VI. PLURAL RATIONALITIB: IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS W A S I Z  - 
THE SlXATEGY OF HESSE AND B A V .  
The disposal of hazardous wastes in an environmentally sound way, with 
flrst priority on the reduction or recycling of wastes, is the stated aim of the  
The price for incinerating PCB's may go as &h as DM 1000 per ton. 
federal government as well as of Hesse and Bavaria. In meeting these goals, 
Hesse and Bavaria have built technologically advanced, integrated facilities 
with a steadily rising investment of public funds, placed a high priority on 
treatment and incineration methods with relatively little direct land disposal, 
and shared the costs between industry and the taxpayer. This strategy has 
been successful through a delicate balancing of different social interests, those 
in support of maintaining a viable waste industry, disposing of wastes in an 
environmentally acceptable manner, and reducing wastes. What. appears 
rational from one perspective, for instance, restricting exports and lowering 
prices, may appear irrational, from the perspective of, for example, those in 
favor of reducing wastes. Hesse and Bavaria seem to  have found a workable 
compromise in balancing these various conflicting interests. 
Public Ownership 
The most striking and significant feature of these two states, especially in 
comparison with other German states and countries, is the  extent of public 
ownership of the waste disposal facilities. By financing capital investments and 
taking responsibility for operations, the state and local government have, in 
effect, assumed responsibility for the risks of hazardous wastes. The liability 
and responsibility of the generator for the long-term disposal of his hazardous 
wastes ends once he turns his wastes over to the public authorities.. This con- 
trasts with the principle of generator responsibility in nearly all other coun- 
tries. For example, in the United States under Section 7003 of RCRA, the EPA 
can bring legal action against anyone handling wastes in a way that  wpresents 
an imminent hazard, where site operators, landowners, transporters, and even 
generators are  all potentially liable [26]. 
The entry of the Hessian and Bavarian authorities in what had been the 
clear domain of the private, commercial sector marked a change in the terms 
of the hazardous waste problem, from creating and sustaining an industrial- 
organizational infrastructure in support of the private commercial facilities to 
sustaining a viable system for the management of the risks presented by hazar- 
dous wastes (for a discussion of these problem definitions, see Wynne, Chapter 
1). While these two perspectives on the problem, or "rationalities'!, are comple- 
mentary, the state authorities appear to have identified themselves as "risk 
managers" as evidenced by their continuing efforts not only to support the 
facilities financially, but to participate in their management and, a t  the same 
time, to entourage the reduction of wastes. 
The most widely recognized advantage of a public authority entering the 
"risk management" business by financing and operating waste disposal facilities 
is that the absence of the profit motive allows greater attention to be given to 
meeting environmental objectives. The conflict between the need to maintain 
an industrial waste catchment and the regulatory need to strictly control the 
types of wastes disposed, or even reduce the wastes, can, in principle. be 
avoided if the facility can rely on a back-up of public financing and aid. The 
strong financial support from the Hessian and Bavarian governments has con- 
tributed to the fact that  wastes handled by the state facilities are generally 
managed by technologies that  render them less toxic or of less risk to the 
environment and the  public despite the fact that  these technologies are more 
expensive than the cheaper forms of waste management. such as  direct land 
disposal, commonly practiced elsewhere. (Also elsewhere as in the Netherlands 
for example, adequate treatment and disposal facilities have been preempted 
by investment uncertainties given no guaranteed market.) 
On the other side, the absence of competition and the profit motive for 
waste management may also lead to the tendency for public operations to 
increase their bureaucracy and operate inefficiently. As a case in point, the 
high costs of the GSB facilities have been, in part, attributed to the expensive 
and supposedly inefficient network of collection facilities which were installed 
during a period of abundant public money, and were later reduced in number 
when public financing became tighter. The disadvantage may be offset by the 
belief that a public facility can be monitored and controlled more effectively by 
the public regulators, although there are also opinions to the contrary.. 
The control factor, or  assuring that wastes are handled safely a t  their 
"grave", may be the most convincing and appealing argument for public facili- 
ties. Experience in many countries has shown the  difaculties in planning, per- 
mitting and monitoring adequate private disposal facilities, which is compli- 
cated by a lack of funds for hiring the  requisite personnel as well as the general 
nonavailability of people sufficiently trained for the jobs involved. A central, 
public or quasi-public facility concentrates expertise on the surveillance and 
control of a comprehensive disposal operation. 
The advantages and disadvantages of government ownership fade somewhat 
with increasing public pressures for the facility to cover its costs. This pres- 
sure will occur naturally as the extent of private investment in the facilities 
increases. There are important advantages of combining public and industrial 
financing and control such as is the case with the HIM (Hesse) and GSB 
* According to an ofRcial in North RhineWestfalia, a private facility can be controlled more 
effectively since i t  can be threatened with closure [27]. This has also been argued in Britain 
by the private industry consortium of national Waste Disposal Contractors. 
(Bavaria) models. Many problems encountered in gaining the cooperation of 
the large industrial firms can be avoided if they become partners in the dispo- 
sal venture. A waste expert from the  Bavarian Bureau of Environmental Protec- 
tion sees this cooperation as the essential ingredient in creating regional facili- 
ties, and even more difficult to establish than the financial base. The good 
cooperation between industry and government allowed a consensus to be 
reached quickly, and the GSB was founded after only a little more than a year of 
negotiations [28]. 
Alternatively, this close partnership between government and industry, 
which is more typical of European regulatory practices than American, can 
effectively diffuse control through "cooption" of the regulators. Advocates of 
more cooperative forms of environmental practices, however, argue that  this 
disadvantage is overcome by the implementation advantages of collaboration 
and workable compromises between industry and government [29,30]. A more 
adversarial system must also reach such compromises, but this is usually 
accomplished through lengthy and expensive court proceedings, in a climate of 
bad faith. 
The Pricing Strategy: A Double Dilemma 
Central to any strategy for waste management is the choice of cost alloca- 
' tion. Usually this choice lies overall between industry and the taxpayer, but 
there are options in between. This choice is related to the question of owner- 
ship. Public ownership lends more flexibility to the pricing decision than a com- 
petitive, private market, but is not a necessary condition for public financial 
support which can come in the form of government subsidies to private enter- 
prises, tax reductions to industry, and so forth. In fact, the early intention of 
HIM, ZVSMM and GSB was to operate as non-profit enterprises but to charge 
industry the full cost of disposal. Financial pressure forced each of these pub- 
lic or quasi-public facilities to gradually pass less of the costs on to their custo- 
mers and more of the  costs on to the taxpayers. 
Yet, relative to out-of-state prices for less costly disposal practices, the 
prices to industry in Bavaria and Hesse remain intentionally high. As a result, 
the GSB and FIM facilities, and to a lesser extent the ZVSMM, are troubled with 
increasing over capacity. Predictions of waste generation, which formed the 
basis for construction of the plants greatly overestimated the quantities pro- 
duced which has remained constant for the past several years. Although 
stricter air pollution and water pollution controls have resulted in the genera- 
tion of more solid wastes, waste reduction due to rising costs of disposal and 
slow economic growth have combined to counteract any growth in the waste 
generation rate. The shortage of waste delivered in the facilities is further 
aggravated by the fact that  the wastes delivered are becoming dirtier, the so- 
called "Bavarian syndrome". The high costs of treatment and incineration is 
prompting &ms to find their own uses for the cleaner wastes and to utilize 
more efacient recycling technologies. 
From the waste-reduction perspective. a measure of success of a high- 
priced facility is how quickly it  manages to put itself out of business. But this 
strategy presents an  obvious dilemma to the public authorities and under- 
scores the conflicting institutional objectives and rationalities. From the point 
of view of a government trying to raise funds for a large capital investor, the 
prospect of middle- or long-term bankruptcy of the operation is less than help- 
ful. I t  is not surprising that in the Netherlands, where the authorities are 
trying to promote privately-financed, integrated facilities, there is a great deal 
of ministerial interest in creating and sustaining a "waste industry", in direct 
conflict with the stated aims of environmental groups for reducing wastes. On 
the other hand, in Hesse the  Environmental Agency has taken direct measures 
to reduce pollution at  the source by making i t  a condition for permitting that  
new industrial facilities or modifications, incorporate the best available techno- 
logies to reduce pollution and wastes.* Yet, a continuing problem in the F.R.G. 
is the overcapacity of the existing facilities which is further frustrated by the 
operation of marginally qualified plants, mostly in other states, which operate 
a t  lower costs. According to the  prestigious Council of Environmental Advisors, 
the granting of operating licences for new plant is strictly dependent on their 
meeting costly environmental standards, which many of the other operators do 
not meet. This has led to a significant difference in price structure between the  
older and newer facilities, which is one reason, according to the Council, why 
highly qualified installations are  underused, while a "special waste t r d c "  to  
inadequate waste disposal facilities is in full swing [31]. 
A pricing policy that encourages the environmental objective of reducing 
hazardous wastes thus conflicts with the economic objective of maintaining a 
reasonable return on the large capital investment in waste facilities. This 
creates a fundamental dilemma between those institutional interests charged 
with reducing environmental risks and those charged with monitoring a viable 
technological waste management system. Yet. there are  effective stop-gap 
measures to this dilemma, as are illustrated by the following measures taken 
by Hesse and Bavaria in the face of decreasing supplies of hazardous wastes: 
* 'Rd policy has been challenged by Hessian industries as being beyond the State's legal au- 
thority. 
Eqansion of the universe of hazardous wastes by adding wastes to the 
list. 
Restriction of the amount of wastes that are exported by requiring all 
wastes, unless officially exempted, to be brought to  the public facili- 
ties ("Benutzungszwang" or "compulsory use"). 
Increasing the amount of wastes delivered by restricting on-site dispo- 
sal. 
Importing wastes from other states and countries. 
These measures. apparently motivated both by the need to maintain a sup- 
ply of wastes to t he  state facilities and by a genuine distrust of the private sec- 
tor in handling wastes. represent a compromise between the conflicting objec- 
tives of reducing wastes and sustaining the capital-intensive facilities. Yet, they 
will not suface in the long-run if the  costs to the waste producers remain high.* 
Lowering these costs, as was done by Hesse and Bavaria by not passkg  the full 
amount of the government subsidies onto the facility users, does contradict the 
government's stated aim of reducing or recycling wastes. Opponents of this 
policy of subsidizing the  disposal of wastes also object on economic grounds in 
that i t  distorts prices and creates an unfair comparative advantage for certain 
Arms. They are fueled in their arguments by the directive se t  out by the Euro- 
pean Economic Community, the "polluter pays" principle, which obliges the 
government to charge polluters the full cost of their pollution [32]. Despite 
being subsidized, the  Hesse costs especially are still high. and higher costs still 
would not only perhaps reach a limit of waste reduction innovation, but also 
encourage illegal disposal. 
Thus the  opposing institutional rationalities prescribed by sustaining 
highly qualified facilities and reducing hazardous waste generation are further 
complicated. A double dilemma arises since any price incentive for reducing 
In the long-run, this dilemma might resolve itself if the facilities became obsolete. 
Indeed, Bavaria plans to phase out slowly these investments. 
wastes is a t  the same time an incentive to dispose illegally of wastes. Inevit- 
ably. high prices for waste disposal encourage both activities; the success of a 
costly environmentally attractive disposal system depends ultimately on 
whether i t  encourages more legitimate recycling and reduction measures while 
controlling illegitimate dumping, burning, or exporting. 
The Enforcement Gap 
The public is becoming increasingly sensitized to  the problems involved in 
managing hazardous waste by the multitude of publicized disasters or near 
disasters, for example, Love Canal in the U.S., Lekkerkerk in the Netherlands, 
and Nievenheim in the F.R.G. The episode of the lost Seveso dioxin barrels, 
which, fortunately for German officials, were found in France, has further 
undermined the public's faith in the ability of regulators to cope with the  
hazardous waste problem. With thousands of diffuse firms producing and tran- 
sporting hazardous wastes and easily accessible opportunities for them to evade 
the system, their full control is close to impossible, especially considering the  
limited funds available in state budgets for this purpose.* A serious disparity 
thus arises then between the legislative efforts to control hazardous wastes and 
the implementation of this legislation. what has been referred to  alternatively 
as the "enforcement gap" [33] and "executive deficit" [34]. 
The most important regulatory "s t i ck  for enforcing compliance with the 
hazardous waste laws are fines which can be as  high as DM 100,000 (~~$44,000), 
however, this may not be high enough to  disuade some generators from 
In Bavaria, there are only four inspectors to control the many hazardous waste generators, 
allowing them, jn effect, to inspect each A r m  only once per year. 
profitably abusing the law. There are no criminal penalties. The Waste Disposal 
Act does not explicitly address questions of liability for environmental damages 
resulting from improper waste disposal practices. Violation of the waste regula- 
tions is, however, a violation of civil law which may result in liability for dam- 
ages. Special regulations apply to accidents during the transport of waste 
which assign strict liability, i.e., i t  is not necessary to prove the fault of the 
driver. In addition, the law requires that transporters and disposers be insured 
against possible accidents [35]. 
Because of the weak economic sanctions and the difficulties in policing so 
complex a system. regulators have repeatedly stressed the importance of infor- 
mation dissemination and moral persuasion in encouraging industry to comply 
with the Waste Disposal Act.* Given the limited financial resources for enforce- 
ment, a t  most. the regulators can inspect and monitor the large generators.** 
But this may be where efforts are least needed since, as a regulator a t  the UBA 
points out, the large flrms are nowadays highly sensitive to hazardous waste 
problems, having made substantial investments in their management. and can 
generally be trusted to comply with regulations [39]. The director of the ZVSMM 
makes a similar point. The economic incentive created by high prices tends to 
encorage large companies to invest in low-waste technologies and recycling; 
however. this economic lever is not so effective for small business, such as 
paint shops or gas stations, which have the (illegal) option of mixing their toxic 
waste with household waste [40]. 
- 
Diver [36] argues that voluntary compliance is a crucial ingredient for most areas of regu- 
lation. 
** Figures exist that show the expense of operating a comprehensive control system can be 
a significant portion (20-40%) of overall disposal costs [37]. In the U.S., the large generators 
are responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of total hazardous waste produc 
tion. The largest 5% of hazardous waste generators produce approximately 98% of the wastes 
[381. 
Ultimately the  success of Bavaria's and Hesse's strategy of charging rela- 
tively high prices for technically and environmentally efficient waste practices 
hinges on the extent to which this strategy has not, in turn. increased the 
amount of illegal or semi-legal disposal practices. As might be expected, there 
are opposing opinions on this. OfRcials in Hesse and Bavaria a t  the state and 
local levels have expressed the opinion that illegal disposal practices, as 
opposed to semi-legal practices. are no longer a significant concern; the prob- 
lem of midnight dumping, they claim, is a problem of the past [41,42]. Alterna- 
tively, civil servants a t  the  Federal Environment Ministry (UBA) are not so 
sanguine about state practices, in general, stating that  the extent of illegal 
practices could be anywhere from 10 to 90 percent. or highly uncertain [43].* 
But the general perception on the part of most officials is that the high disposal 
prices in Hesse and Bavaria have not increased the amount of illegal, "mid- 
night" dumping, though the extent of these practices remains highly uncertain. 
The more serious problem, i t  seems, is the transport of hazardous wastes 
over the state or  national borders to less-qualified facilities. In theory. a waste 
management firm in another state should not accept wastes that are tran- 
sported without permission from Hesse or Bavaria; however, officials state that, 
in practice, i t  is not dimcult for generators to find out-of-state Arms willing to 
take their wastes. There is also a lucrative waste tr&c to the G.D.R. 
Waste experts at  t he  state and federal level are also in agreement that 
there is a large "grey area" which is not strictly illegal, yet is not entirely in 
the spirit of the law. Schenkel, from the UBA. compares hazardous waste regu- 
.lations in the F.R.G. with tax regulation where, in both cases, elaborate formal 
* An opposing opinion w a s  offered by an expert at the Ministry for the Lnteriorin Bonn, who 
states that, in contrast to the EC countries, where on the average only about 507. of hazar- 
dous wastes is disposed of correctly, in the P.R.G. this percentage is closer to 75 or 80% [44]. 
rules and bureaucracy exist, but because these rules are systematically scru- 
tinized for loopholes, the regulations are only partially effective [45]. One such 
problem is the declaration of a waste as an economic good, relieving the 
entrepreneur of his obligation to register the waste, which may eventually be 
sold or burned in facilities lacking the necessary environmental equipment.* 
This practice does not come under the direct control of the state. Generators 
may also mix their wastes with used oil or they can discharge their wastes as 
waste water.; Additionally, it  is important to recall that a large amount of 
hazardous wastes are disposed of on-site. which, for reasons other than inten- 
tional abuses, may be insufficiently controlled and result in environmental pol- 
lution. For this reason, Hessian and Bavarian authorities are attempting to 
curtail on-aite disposal of hazardous wastes. 
Hucke 1471 has shown, in connection w i t h  enforcing air pollution controls, 
that under the surface of relatively clear regulatory standards the  actual prac- 
tice of implementation involves a significant amount of bargaining between 
regulators and firms, ra ther  than the command and compliance usually 
assumed. One important reason for this is the separation of function between 
state officials, who have the better technical knowledge, and local ofacials, who, 
in the case of air pollution, are  charged with issuing the licenses and sanctions 
for noncompliance. Waste management ofacials have the same, if not more, 
discretionary powers as regulators of air emissions. There exist precise lists of 
hazardous wastes; yet, officials have to use their judgement in determining 
whether a firm's waste is eauivalent to the waste listed with respect to chemical 
* Riickel attributes environmental problems from recycling hazardous wastes by the pre  
ducers to result more from the technical wear out of the recycling technologies than from 
the "bad" intentions of the producers. He suggests that these firms be periodically re- 
licensed for recycling [46]. 
composition, concentration levels, and so forth (see Wynne, Chapters 2 and 3). 
Similarly, judgement comes to bear in the process of licensing public facilities 
and transporters, in approving on-site facilities, and even in allocating the time 
of the limited number of inspectors, e.g., four inspectors for the whole of 
Bavaria. As in other areas of environmental regulation, the process of bargain- 
ing between regulators and firms in the F.R.G. is ever present, and significantly 
extends the "grey area" of hazardous waste practices. 
M. LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES: NORJW KHINE-WESFALLA 
AND THE UNITED STATES AS COMPARATIVE W L E S  
The viability of a hazardous waste mangement system will depend ulti- 
a 
mately on its compatability with the economic, institutional and political cul- 
ture in which it is expected to work Even seemingly independent parts of the 
system, for example the technologies employed, cannot be assumed transfer- 
able to  other countries without sometimes substantial changes in the technol- 
ogy itself.or the institutions which have responsibility for its operation. In this 
section, we examine the more important aspects of the Hessian and Bavarian 
hazardous waste management systems within the economic and political con- 
text of the F.R.G. Because of the different management philosophy in the state 
of North Rhine-Westfalia and generally in the United States. we will highlight 
these systems as comparative examples. 
Public Ownership 
The system in Bavaria and Hesse stands in sharp contrast to the United 
States, where the strong tradition of private ownership has led to a 
predominant "s t ick philosophy of government regulation. Almost without 
exception, hazardous wastes are collected and handled by private 
entrepreneurs, and a large percentage of wastes are handled on-site. The net- 
work of generators, transporters, and facility operators are regulated under the 
1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and its accompanying 
Administrative Orders. RCRA lays out a broad framework for the comprehensive 
control of hazardous wastes with five major elements [48]: 
1. a federal classification system; 
2. a trip ticket control system; 
3. federal standards for generators, transporters, and disposal facilities; 
4. a permitting program; 
5. the authorization of state programs to substitute for the federal pro- 
gram. 
The details,of the framework were developed within the EPA and promulgated as 
regulations on May 19, 1980. 
The "sticks" available to the EPA and the states to enforce compliance with 
the regulators are of two types-punishment and liability. RCRA provides rather 
stringent civil and criminal penalties for violations of the regulations. For 
instance, a company or individual found to be qriminally violating the regula- 
tions is subject to penalties of up to $50,000 per day and imprisonment for up to 
two years. But more effective than the threat of civil or criminal punishment is 
the possibility of financial liability for the damage from the improper manage- 
ment of hazardous wastes. Recent actions taken by the government in cleaning 
up past dumping sites has alerted the business community to the large sums of 
money required, and the possibility of their liability. In addition, large esta- 
blished firms are concerned about the damage that a civil or criminal law suit 
would do to their public image. Many observers of the implementation of RCRA 
feel that these sanctions, particularly the possibility of generator liability, are 
motivating firms, especially the larger operations. to comply with the regula- 
tions [49]. 
The F.R.G., in contrast. has relatively less severe sanctions for non- 
compliance with the hazardous waste regulations and virtually no concept of 
generator liability for environmental or public health damages. The stronger 
emphasis in the F.RG. on the "carrots" versus the U.S. emphasis on the "sticks" 
is firmly rooted in the political cultures of these two countries. In the F.R.G., 
and even more strongly in many other European countries, there is a tradition 
of government-industry cooperation in formulating and implementing stan- 
dards and regulations (for a discussion of this point in the context of the 
preparation of the hazardous waste lists, see Dowling and Linnerooth, Chapter 
4). In gerieral, the government has a,relativeiy large'role in supporting and 
sometimes subsidizing industrial development. In contrast, U. S. government- 
industry relations are far more adversarial, especially with regard to environ- 
mental issues, as seen most strongly by the lack of industry consultation in the 
early stages of developing environmental standards and regulations. Consistent 
with this spirit of noncooperation, the U.S. relies far more extensively on legal 
sanctions as incentives for compliance. 
Irrespective of this contrast in government-industry relations, the F.R.G. 
and the U.S. share a common "market" ideology, and the respective govern- 
ments are reluctant to provide services that can be accomodated by private 
enterprise. .Not to curtail private initiatives in the area of waste disposal, the 
F.R.G. Council of Environmental Advisors advises against the substitution of 
private waste disposal Arms by municipal projects in government programs 
encouraging the construction of new waste disposal plants [50]. Thus. in some 
respects the development of public or quasi-public hazardous waste facilities in 
Bavaria and Hesse is as much an anomaly in the F.R.G. as such a development 
would be in the U.S. Their present'existence can be better understood by look- 
ing at the historical conditions in which they were created. 
The HIM facilities in Hesse began wholly as a private venture on the part of 
Hessian industries to exploit a market for waste disposal; similarly, the GSB 
facilities in Bavaria were created by the initiative of private industry with only 
a small amount of government financial support. Since there did not exist a t  
that time a well-defined or well-organized group of smaller private firms han- 
dling wastes in these states, the state governments did not meet with polictical 
opposition from a waste-handling industry when they increased subsidies to, 
and effectively took over, the HIM and GSB operations. In fact, the government 
was supporfing the interests of private enterprise, not of the waste disposers, 
but of the waste generators. The ZVSMM, alternatively, has a different history in 
that it was from the start  a fully public enterprise and, for this reason, is an 
exceptional case even in the F.R.G. Yet again. in the the case of the ZVSMM, 
there did not exist a well-developed and politically powerful network of private 
waste disposal Arms. 
m e r i e n c e  in North Bim- Westjalia 
The German state of North Rhine-Westfalia (NRW) offers a useful contrast to 
its neighboring states, Hesse and Bavaria, in that  i t  has attempted a mixture of 
private and state-financed facilities for hazardous waste management. North 
Rhine-Westfalia is the  F.RG.'s major hazardous waste producing state, generat- 
ing nearly twice as much hazardous wastes as the other ten states combined 
[51]. The highly industrialized and densely populated Ruhr region is located in 
this state, which administratively is organized into autonomous cities and 
counties that,  in turn. have instituted a regional structure, the Kommunalver- 
band Ruhrgebiet (KVR), to deal with common problems such as hazardous waste 
management. Recognizing a need for facilities with higher environmental stan- 
dards than those offered by private entrepreneurs, the KVR has planned and 
partially carried out the construction of a central incineration facility (Her- 
ten), central multi-component and special-waste land disposal facilities, and 
four collection centers. This system is fully financed by the KVR. 
This plan for an independent public system to  supplement the private 
waste handling sector has not been fully successful. The incineration facility a t  
Herten, for instance, has serious financial problems due partly to unanticipated 
technical problems, but. more importantly, to a lack of state financial or regu- 
latory assistance. The highly priced services offered a t  Herten cannot compete 
with environmentally less attractive alternatives offered by the state and out- 
of-state private market. For example. a generator of varnish residue can 
legally choose whether he pays DM450/ton for its incineration, DM2OO/ton for 
its storage a t  the Herfa-Neuroda underground deposit. DMBO/ton for its deposit 
in a special waste land disposal facility, or,. after mixing it with sand. DM5/ton 
for its deposit in a construction rubble landAll [52]. Even strict standarization 
and regulation on the state level would not prevent generators from taking 
advantage of laxer regulations in other states, unless an export ban were also 
imposed. 
Co mpulso ry Use (Benut zungszzuang ) 
The crucial difference between the Herten operation and those in Hesse 
and Bavaria is the lack of legislation requiring compulsory use 
(Ben~tzun~szwang)  of the public or semi-public facilities. The problem is 
partly administrative in that  the KVR has no legal authority to impose restric- 
tions, and state authorities have not passed legislation effectively creating a 
public monopoly a t  the expense of the many smaller handlers. State subsidies 
that reduce the Herten prices to competitive levels is the only remaining 
option to keep the facility in operation, but this option will undoubtedly also 
meet with opposition from the  private sector [53]. 
The experience in NRW underscores the importance of the historical condi- 
tions in which the relatively successful waste disposal systems in Hesse and 
Bavaria were put into place. A desire on the part of public authorities to 
finance an environmentally comprehensive system of disposal facilities, com- 
bined with the explicit cooperation of waste generators and little political oppo- 
sition fro& a private waste disposal industry, was important, though not 
entirely sufficient. In addition, the state regulators needed the legal authority 
to  assure a market for their  facilities. In the absence of standardized regula- 
tions across the German states, as was the explicit goal of the U.S. Congress in 
passing the RCRA legislation. i t  is essential for a state system to exclude the 
possibility of waste exports as competition for its facilities. The legal power of 
Hesse and Bavaria in establishing compulsory use, though controversial in the 
F.R.G., and now Europe generally, reflects the  greater powers of the German 
states compared to their American counterparts, where a compulsory-use 
clause would be likely to be considered unconstitutional. The European Com- 
munity. consistent with its free trade philosophy, has proposed a directive 
prohibiting restrictions on cross-border transfers of hazardoils wastes. This pro- 
posal is understandably of considerable concern to Hessian and Bavarian 
authorities [54]. 
Central versus Decentralized Facilities 
An important choice facing many regional or state authorities is whether 
they should encourage the construction of regional, integrated facilities serv- 
ing a diverse clientele of hazardous waste generators or whether, instead, they 
should encourage a greater number of more specialized facilities. The distinc- 
tion between the two is not entirely clear-cut, however, since specialized facili- 
ties may serve a large number of generators and regional facilities may not be 
integrated but consist of several more specialized handlers. Nor is the  choice 
unrelated to the question of public financing and ownership since, as we have 
pointed out above, the  large capital investment in regional facilities will likely, 
though not inevitably, require public financial support. 
The ad;antages of a large, centralized operation is that  it offers increased 
opportunities for resource recovery and economies of scale with respect to 
applying advanced and environmentally safe technologies. e.g. stack scrubbers, 
leachate collectors, and so forth. In fact, high-temperature rotary-kiln 
incineration is only practical on a large scale. Also. i t  is far easier for the  
authorities to oversee the operation of a small number of facilities, which 
operate with a staff large enough to  include environmental experts, than a mul- 
titude of smaller operations. The technical stafT may also be better equipped to 
cope with any novel problems that  may arise. 
While central facilities may be better equipped and easier to monitor, they 
have some drawbacks. One important problem concerns the distances that  
transporters must haul wastes, with the consequent increase in transportation 
costs and risks*, as facilities become concentrated in certain areas. 
* According to Furmaier in the Bavarian Bureau of Environmental Protection, the transport 
costs are &ally insignificant compared to the disposal costs. He recommends a system 
like. the GSB with central facilities and a network of collection centers [55]. HIM, and also 
Furthermore, the surveillance of waste transfers is perhaps the most difficult 
element to manage with regard to the requisite manpower and individual 
checks. Increasing the hazardous waste trafflc will undoubtedly raise 
significant administrative dimculties. A second disadvantage regarding larger 
facilities is the potential dangers from dealing with wastes in large quantities. 
The bureaucracy of the facility becomes more meshed in administrative detail 
as waste traffic increases, especially a t  that  point where there is no longer an 
identifiable and stable relationship between the handler and his clientele. In 
other words, small specialized Arms have the advantage of a relatively constant 
stream of wastes which they are experienced in handling and for which they are 
generally clear about the  composition. This experience and specialization 
becomes especially relevant for an industry structure of mostly large Arms 
which treat  their own wastes. For this reason, many experts have expressed the 
opinion that large. integrated facilities are sensible only for a region with an 
industry structure characterized by small- or middle-sized Arms, such as in 
Bavaria, but are not so well suited for a region such as North Rhine-Westfalia, 
characterized by larger waste producing industries. 
, ? 3 p w k n c e  in the U.S. 
In 1974, the Environmental Protection Agency prepared a reprt to the U.S. 
Congress which advocates regional, centralized processing facilities for hazar- 
dous wastes [56]. No suggestion was made that the government might actually 
build or run these facilities, but it might give assistance by creating a franchise 
Danish municipalities, are experimenting with a scheme whereby the publicly-owned collec- 
tion centers pick up the wastes for the generators. This does not reduce the transportation 
distances, but it does give government authorities more control over the transport of 
wastes. 
system with territorial limits. Although hazardous waste legislation was subse- 
quently passed and is now being implemented, there exist to date no integrated 
facilities of a kind similar to those existing in Hesse and Bavaria. The hazar- 
dous waste industry remains in private hands, and neither private 
entrepreneurs nor public officials have sensed a market for large, regional facil- 
ities sufficient to justify the substantial capital investments necessary. This 
does not mean that there are no large operations, however. By 1980, four major 
firms had nearly half the sales revenue of the entire industry [5?] .  Chemical 
Waste Management, Inc.. for instance. has an estimated 40% of the U.S. market 
and provides a variety of treatment, disposal and storage facilities; yet. it  
largely offers land disposal and consequently has not invested the large sums of 
capital necessary for more incineration and treatment technologies. There 
also exist large-scale, rqtary-kiln incinerators. but these usually serve a Axed 
and identifiable number of industries requiring, specifically, this service. 
There have been, and continue to  be, however, attempts a t  establishing 
privately-financed, regional facilities. Rollins Environmental Services, which 
began operations in 1969 in New Jersey, planned in the early 1970's a national 
network of twenty-five integrated facilities as well as extensive on-site efforts to 
reduce waste stream volumes a t  the source. From the start, RES favored 
incineration, though it offered, and offers, other methods. Its ambitious plans 
for comprehensive and environmentally safe facilities. however, were not real- 
ized since it became apparent that there was not a market for expensive treat- 
ment and incineration of hazardous wastes. and there did not exist sufficient 
effective government regulation to create the  market. 
More recently, the IT Corporation. which began operating in California, has 
applied for the necessary permits to build a major integrated (land disposal, 
treatment and rotary-kiln incineration) facility in Louisianna. with a large ini- 
tial capital investment (approximately $100 million). IT recognizes that this is 
a high risk venture, but believes the relatively strict hazardous waste regula- 
tions in Louisianna will create a market for its comprehensive and expensive 
services, including advisory services to industries to help them reduce their 
wastes. 
Experience from Bavaria, Hesse, and North Rhine-Westfalia gives reason to 
be pessimistic about IT's commercial chances unless the state government 
offers strong regulatory (or financial) support. I t  may prove necessary to give 
franchise rights, creating a private monopoly, and effectively restricting the 
entry of smaller firms that  may capture specialized niches of the Louisianna 
market. A%an on landAll for priority wastes would assure a certain market for 
IT's incineration facility. Yet, in the absence of standardized practices in neigh- 
boring states. these measures will be of little help if the state cannot restrict 
exports of wastes. IT's long-term prospects also appear limited by the capacity 
shown in Hesse and Bavaria for waste reduction as an alternative to expensive 
disposal, which IT plans to  exploit in the short run by serving as a consulting 
service but which, in the  long run, may reduce its overall commercial chances. 
The future of comprehensive, regional facilities in the U.S., such as those 
found in Hesse and Bavaria, will depend on the developing role of government 
regulation. Since it  is unlikely that  state or local ofBcials will provide large 
subsidies, there must be a market for private investors to exploit. Furthermore, 
the market must be stable enough in the location or catchment of each plant, 
not merely overall. The proposed ammendments to RCRA presently considered 
in its reauthorization would ban land disposal for a signifiant number of hazar- 
dous wastes, and would thus promote more expensive technologies with 
decreased environmental risks. The new regulations, if enforced uniformly 
across states, coupled with an industry structure characterized by many 
smaller heterogeneous generators, may provide such a market. For other 
industry structures, we can expect increased investment in on-site facilities as 
well as smaller entrepreneurs capturing the market offered by the many 
developing niches of hazardous waste streams [58] .  
Wing Hazardous Wmte Facilities 
Finally, the that  industrialized countries are  experiencing in sit- 
ing hazardous waste facilities cannot be ignored. According to many observers, 
the siting of new disposal facilities is the most urgent problem in the area of 
hazardous waste management. Even in the.F.R.G., with present over-capacity in 
some states, projections of hazardous waste generation and the lead time 
necessary for capital-intensive facilities continue to make the siting problem 
important. Obtaining public approval to site waste facilities may be the most 
dimcult obstacle in implementing a regional or state hazardous waste plan. 
Spurred by controversies over nuclar power plants, the  public is becoming 
increasingly sensitive to chemical waste facilities, especially if these facilities 
are to be located in their neighborhoods. Construction of the  early facilities in 
Hesse and Bavaria went virtually unopposed by the public. Yet. recently, a 
great deal of protest has arisen on the part of residents near the Biebesheim 
facility in Hesse, although this facility is considered by experts to be technially 
advanced and, from an environmental point of view, far preferable to past 
operations. Similarly, citizen action groups are heatedly opposing the con- 
struction of a landfill by the ZVSMM in Bavaria. Other countries are facing 
equally difficult obstacles in siting facilities. In the U.S., for instance, 
Massachusetts has passed novel siting legislation that involves all the 
interested parties, including the public, in the siting process by requiring medi- 
ation. In spite of this new siting law hazardous waste authorities continue to 
have problems in gaining permission to build facilities. 
I t  is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the many social and 
economic issues involved in siting hazardous facilities (for a comprehensive 
discussion of experience in the U.S., see [59]). I t  is worth noting that state 
ofRcials in the F.R.G., reversing their usual regard for autonomy, are turning to 
the federal government to set out standards for hazardous waste facilities in 
the hope that this higher authority will increase public confidence in the safe 
operation of facilities. There appears, however, to be little difference in the 
public acceptability of facilities operated by the state or private entrepeneurs. 
Price Subsidies 
At  the core of any hazardous waste management system is the question of 
who pays the costs. Despite directives by the EEC to force polluters, or indus- 
try, to pay the full costs of their pollution, in Europe there is  a strong tradition 
of the government picking up the tab for pollution in contrast to  the U.S. where 
the government hesitates to aid industry directly. In Holland, for example, 
government oUlcials generally agree that  it would be politically impossible to 
institute a "superfund" tax on industry as a way of paying the clean up costs for 
past dump sites; rather, i t  is expected that the national and local governments 
will pay the costs. 
The mixed ideologies in the  F.R.G. of laissez fa i re .  on the one hand, and 
government-industry cooperation, on the other, explain the early reluctance, 
but later support, for public subsidies on the part of the Hessian and Bavarian 
authorities. But these subsidies were clearly not in the spirit of allowing indus- 
try a "free ride" since prices remain relatively high in these two states. An 
option not considered in the paper, but discussed elsewhere [60] is that  of the 
government paying a large portion, or even the full costs of hazardous waste 
management, by offering low-cost or even free facilities. 
Opponents of government subsidies are concerned both about the equity of 
passing on the costs to the general public as well as the resultipg distortions in 
the prices resulting in misplaced incentives for producing wastes. Lower han- 
dling costs for wastes, as discussed in Section VI, encourage their generation 
and discourage waste reduction and recycling. 
Cost or price incentives, though proven effective, are not the only option 
for promoting the reduction or recycling of hazardous wastes. For instance, 
the government might tie tax advantages or low-cost financing to Arms which 
take initiatives in reducing wastes. O r ,  the  government might reduce the costs 
to  firms for investing in new capital equipment by offering low-cost financing, 
higher depreciation allowances, and direct government assistance and advice. 
The UBA in the F.R.G., for instance, finances research for this purpose and 
directly advises firms about the technical possibilities for recycling or waste 
reduction.* As another example mentioned earlier, the Hessian government is 
tying construction permits for new facilities to a demonstration that  the firm is 
using the best available technology for waste reduction. 
According to a waste expert from the federal Environment Minisrry (UBA), there have been 
numerous successes in encouraging waste reduction and recycling: Acids from the produc- 
tion of titanium oxide pigment are now treated within the factory; chlorinated solvaents for 
metal treatment are now recycled; residues from sulfur filters on power plants are now used 
in the production of plaster; the improvement in production processes has reduced the loss 
of vamish from around 50X to 5% [61]. 
The U.S., alternatively, relies almost exclusively on price incentives to pro- 
mote waste reduction and recycling, whereby these incentives may be in the 
form of artificially.high prices or taxes. A private initiative in this respect was 
taken by Dow Chemicals in the  middle 1960's when it began charging its plant 
managers $100 for each drum of hazardous waste buried in a landfill, resulting 
in increased recycling efforts. An important initiative being considered by the 
federal government and already initiated by eleven states is the waste-end tax 
or a tax placed directly on waste generators. This tax may be used as a way of 
replacing or supplementing the feedstock tax that  presently finances state and 
federal "superfunds" with the argument that  the tax serves the second purpose 
of reducing wastes [62]. I t  is too early to judge fully the experience of the 
states with. ..this tax, but there appears to be a major drawback. In most of the 
states, the tax failed to raise the funds anticipated, and there was a dramatic 
drop in reported waste volumes (20% decline in California within one year). 
This decline came too quickly to be explained by increased recycling but rather 
appears to be largely the result of under-reporting and possibly midnight dump- 
ing [63]. 
Ym. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING RBfARKS 
Given the difficulties most western. industrialized countries are encounter- 
ing in implementing their hazardous waste legislation, the  concept of public or 
joint public-industry ownership and control of the hazardous waste disposal 
facilities has a great deal of appeal. As experience in Hesse and Bavaria has 
shown, public ownership (full or partial) permits the authorities to choose cons- 
ciously between the amount of capital investment in treatment and disposal 
facilities, the environmental measures taken, the location and centralization of 
the facilities. the collection system employed, as well as the amount of costs 
passed on to i;dustry or the taxpayer. The strategy of Hesse and Bavaria is to 
minimize the direct land disposal of hazardous wastes, substituting this method 
with more expensive incineration and treatment technologies, and to share the 
costs between the waste generators and the general public. The authorities 
have intentionally maintained relatively high disposal prices to encourage the 
reduction and recycling of wastes, with apparent success, as witnessed by the 
decreased volume of wastes delivered to the facilities. 
This pricing policy creates a dilemma for the authorities in that high 
prices also encourage illegal disposal. But the general perception of waste 
experts is that waste reduction in Hesse and Bavaria is for the most part 
genuine and cannot be attributed to decreased reporting and "midnight dump- 
ing". However, t he  authorities do acknowledge that  an unknown quantity of 
wgstes are  being illegally transported to other states or countries and that 
some "recycled wastes" are  incinerated without adequate environmental con- 
trols. 
The pricing decision presents yet anbther dilemma to the authorities in 
that a decreased volume of wastes reduces revenues- for the facilities and 
places an ever increasing burden in the state to subsidize the  disposal system. 
The economic objective of maintaining a return on the large capital investment 
in facilities conflicts. then, with the environmental objective of reducing 
wastes, resulting in further conflicting institutional rationalities and percep 
tions of the hazardous waste problem. The authorities in Hesse and Bavaria 
have responded to this dilemma by lowering prices somewhat beneath costs, 
and thus sharing the burden of waste disposal with the public, and taking a 
variety of measures to  increase the flow of wastes to the state facilities. These 
measures include restricting exports of wastes with the important 
"Benutzungszwang" or compulsory use of state/industry facilities and 
effectively legislating a state/industry monopoly, expaning the list of hazar- 
dous wastes that  require the facilities services, and restricting on-site disposal. 
To assess the appropriateness of public ownership and centralized facili- 
ties, the Hessian and Bavarian disposal systems must be viewed in their full 
economic, political, and historical context. The emergence of a publicly- 
financed monopoly to accomodate a market that  is generally in private hands is 
as much an anomaly in the  F.R.C., which stands committed to competitive 
enterprise, as in other capitalist, market economies. Historically, the Hessian 
and Bavarian systems (with the exception of Mittelfranken) were set up by a 
consortium of private industries with little competition from the almost non- 
existent private waste handling sector. The financial failure of these early ini- 
tiatives led to  government intervention with the full support of the waste gen- 
erating industry. With the recent emergence of many small waste handlers in 
those countries or states having passed strong legislation. these conditions for 
government intervention and ownership may not repeat themselves. 
Experience in Hesse and Bavaria highlights other conditi0n.s to the success 
of public or semi-public, centralized systems. The importance of restricting 
exports of waste and on-site disposal cannot be over-emphasized, as the near 
failure of the Herten incineration facility in North Rhine-Westfalia illustrates. A 
market for the facilities is only fully secure when its exclusive use is 
guaranteed by eliminating competitors, possibly by stricter regulations govern- 
ing licensing, and even then the market is not fully secure in the long run if 
wastes are reduced by changing production processes. 
Integrated, comprehensive facilities that offer a range of disposal and 
treatment technologies have many advantages for environmental c ~ n t r o l s ,  but 
appear to be most appropriate for regions with a heterogeneous industrial 
structure including many middle-sized or smaller generators and less appropri- 
ate for regions with larger firms which are better prepared to treat their own 
wastes. The success of private ownership of large, integrated facilities, such as 
proposed by IT for Louisianna in the  U.S., will depend on the extent of govern- 
ment regulation that channels wastes to the more expensive treatment and 
disposal facilities, and also on the  extent to which out-of-state transfers of 
wastes can be controlled. Experience in Hesse and Bavaria sheds doubt on the 
commercial chances of private flrms undertaking the large capital investment 
necessary for comprehensive facilities. The consequent uncertainties in the 
viability of such initiatives imposes brittleness upon the  regulatory system 
which needs such a treatment and disposal infrastructure. 
In this paper, we have examined one type of organizational system for han- 
dling a regions hazardous waste problems that  appears to have been successful 
relative to other states and countries. Although the legal, economic, and politi- 
cal conditions under which this type of system emerged in Hesse and Bavaria 
may not be present in other states and countries, the underlying philosophy of 
shifting more of the burden of hazardous waste disposal, a t  least in the short 
run. onto the public sector (with a strong element of generator-participation 
too) may be desirable and could take different forms to suit local or national 
conditions. 
Any country or region seriously intent upon shifting disposal practices 
from land disposal to the more expensive, and safer, treatment and incinera- 
tion methods. should give serious consideration to different forms of public 
involvement, including public subsidies. The compelling reason for this, shown 
throughout this paper, is the strong probability of failure of the private market 
in providing the  more expensive disposal and treatment technologies. The 
approach of imposing strict regulations to channel wastes away from land 
disposal, and thus creating a market for other technologies, relies on the abil- 
ity of governments to enforce compliance with the regulations which, at the 
present. appears constrained by the limited state budgets for this purpose, the 
difficulties in standardizing practices across regions, states, or countries. the  
diversity of waste generators that must be controlled, and the multitude of 
channels open to evade the system. I t  appears almost inevitable that the  
authorities provide incenitives for compliance, or "carrots", along with the  
sanctions for non-compliance, or "sticks". In doing so the responsible public 
authorities will have to move significantly towards direct "absorption" of the  
risks involved. 
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